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I. Introduction 
No doubt when historians of science look back on the first decade of the twenty-first century, they will dub 
it “The Age of the fMRI.” Functional magnetic resonance imaging has revolutionized the empirical study 
of the human mind, leading to far-reaching changes in the research paradigms of psychology, economics, 
and (especially) the burgeoning field of neuroscience; by one estimate, an average of eight peer-reviewed 
articles employing fMRI were published per day in 2007.1 So perhaps it was inevitable that empirically 
minded  philosophers  would  take  some  of  these  fMRI  studies  to  have  profound  implications  for 
philosophy. Indeed, it has recently been argued that the ground-breaking research by psychologist Joshua 
D. Greene and colleagues into the neural bases for our moral intuitions should lead us to change our 
opinions about the trustworthiness of those intuitions. Crudely put, Greene and his colleagues think there 
are  two  warring  subsystems  underlying  our  moral  intuitions:  the  first  makes  use  of  emotional  neural 
processes and generates the sorts of judgments typically associated with deontological positions in ethics; 
the second makes use of more cognitive neural processes and generates the sorts of judgments typically 
associated with utilitarian/consequentialist positions in ethics; and the two subsystems duke it out for one’s 
overall moral verdict about a given case.2 By itself, this claim is merely an empirical hypothesis about 
what, as a matter of fact, causes us to make the moral judgments that we do make. However, Peter Singer 
and Greene himself have argued that this empirical hypothesis, if true, would also yield conclusions about 
the sorts of moral judgments that we should make. In particular, Singer and Greene think that the truth of 
Greene’s empirical hypothesis would give us good grounds to discount our deontological intuitions about 
                                                         
1  Jonah Lehrer, “Picture Our Thoughts: We’re Looking for Too Much in Brain Scans,” The Boston Globe (August 17, 2008). 
2  Joshua  D.  Greene,  R.  Brian  Sommerville,  Leigh  E.  Nystrom,  John  M.  Darley,  and  Jonathan  D.  Cohen,  “An  fMRI 
Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment,” Science 293 (2001): 2105-08; Joshua D. Greene, Leigh E. Nystrom, 
Andrew D. Engell, John M. Darley, and Jonathan D. Cohen, “The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral 
Judgment,” Neuron 44 (2004): 389-400; and Joshua  D. Greene, Sylvia  A.  Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg,  Leigh  E. Nystrom,  and 
Jonathan D. Cohen, “Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment,” Cognition 107 (2008): 1144-54.   2 
cases, but not to discount our utilitarian/consequentialist intuitions about cases.3 
  In this article I wish to scrutinize this last claim. More specifically, I will argue that once we 
separate the bad arguments for why Greene et al.’s empirical research has normative implications from 
the better arguments for that conclusion, we can see that the neuroscientific results are actually doing no 
work in those better arguments. Or to put my central contention most provocatively: either attempts to 
derive normative implications from these neuroscientific results rely on a shoddy inference, or they appeal 
to substantive normative intuitions (usually about what sorts of features are or are not morally relevant) 
that render the neuroscientific results irrelevant to the overall argument. However, my conclusions here 
are not entirely negative: although I am skeptical about the prospects for deriving normative implications 
from neural facts about how we happen to reach moral verdicts, in the article’s final section I sketch a way 
in which neuroscience could play a more indirect role in sculpting our normative conclusions. 
  It  should  be  clear  that  much  is  at  stake  in  this  debate.  Obviously  if  Greene’s  and  Singer’s 
arguments for why we should privilege our consequentialist intuitions over our deontological ones were 
sound, there would be far-reaching implications for contemporary debates in first-order ethics. But the 
implications are even wider than that. So far the only sorts of philosophical intuitions that have been 
systematically studied using brain-imaging technology have been moral intuitions about cases, and even 
then moral intuitions about only a small class of cases. However, it is only a matter of time before fMRI-
based studies of other varieties of philosophical intuitions are conducted—only a matter of time before 
someone, somewhere, studies what parts of the brain light up when the typical person has intuitions about 
general phenomena such as knowledge or free will, or about specific puzzles such as Newcomb’s problem 
or the sorites  paradox. One  can almost see how  this research  will go. First, no doubt,  someone  will 
hypothesize that there are two separate systems vying for one’s overall verdict about whether a given 
hypothetical scenario counts as an instance of knowledge, or causation, or free action. Then, no doubt, 
someone (possibly the same person) will conclude that the empirical evidence for this hypothesis gives us 
                                                         
3  Peter Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions,” The Journal of Ethics 9 (2005): 331-52; Joshua D. Greene, “From Neural ‘Is’ to Moral 
‘Ought’: What Are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4 (2003): 847-50; and 
Joshua D. Greene, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul,” in Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, 
and Development, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008), pp. 35-79.   3 
good reason to discount the verdicts of one of those systems but not the other. So if the sorts of arguments 
offered by Greene and Singer are successful, they have the potential to radically alter how we go about 
adjudicating whether philosophical intuitions of a given sort are reliable—and, by extension, to radically 
alter the methodology with which we go about arguing for first-order philosophical claims. 
  Enough  speculation,  though,  about  what  sorts  of  empirical  research  may  or  may  not  be 
conducted in the future, and about what sorts of philosophical arguments may or may not be offered on 
the basis of that research. My task here will be to focus on the neuroscientific research that has been 
conducted into the physiological basis for our moral intuitions about hypothetical cases, and on what the 
normative implications of that research might be. Thus the first order of business will be to summarize the 
essential details of Greene et al.’s research. 
II. Neuroscientific Results 
Greene and his colleagues chose to focus their empirical studies on our moral intuitions about a certain 
class of cases made famous by Philippa Foot and Judith Jarvis Thomson.4 Consider the following scenario 
(here I use the exact wording employed by Greene et al. in their studies): 
trolley driver dilemma:  “You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a 
fork in the tracks. On the tracks extending to the left is a group of five railway workmen. 
On the tracks extending to the right is a single railway workman. 
If  you  do  nothing  the  trolley  will  proceed  to  the  left,  causing  the  deaths  of  the  five 
workmen. The only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to hit a switch on your 
dashboard that will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, causing the death of the 
single workman. 
Is  it  appropriate  for  you  to  hit  the  switch  in  order  to  avoid  the  deaths  of  the  five 
workmen?”5 
Assuming that our topic is moral appropriateness, most people judge that it is appropriate to hit the switch. 
However, contrast that case with the following (again, the wording is Greene et al.’s): 
                                                         
4  See Philippa Foot, “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect,” Oxford Review 5 (1967): 5-15; Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem,” The Monist 59 (1976): 204-17; and Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The 
Trolley Problem,” Yale Law Journal 94 (1985): 1395-415. All three articles are reprinted in Ethics: Problems and Principles, ed. John 
Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (Fort Worth, Tex.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992). 
5  Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation,” supplementary material (available at <http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/ 
full/sci;293/5537/2105/DC1/>).   4 
footbridge dilemma: “A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen 
who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge 
over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on 
this footbridge is a stranger who happens to be very large. 
The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge 
and onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die 
if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved. 
Is it appropriate for you to push the stranger on to the tracks in order to save the five 
workmen?”6 
Most people judge that it is not appropriate to push the large stranger. What explains this difference in our 
moral judgments? On the one hand, it might seem puzzling that a majority of people judge differently 
about these two cases, since in each what is at stake is the life of five people versus the life of one. But on 
the other hand, there are myriad differences between these two scenarios that could (it might be thought) 
explain why most of us make a moral distinction between them. 
  The task of trying to fix on a morally relevant feature of these two scenarios that explains why we 
are justified in giving differing verdicts about them has come to be known as the trolley problem.7 Usually the 
presupposition of this literature is that our moral intuitions about these cases (and others of their ilk) are 
largely accurate, the goal being to find a plausible moral principle that both agrees with and explains our 
intuitive verdicts about the cases in question. But what makes the trolley problem so hard—indeed, what 
has led some to despair of our ever finding a solution to it—is that for nearly every principle that has been 
proposed to explain our intuitions about trolley cases, some ingenious person has devised a variant of the 
                                                         
6  Ibid. 
7  Actually, this isn’t entirely correct. The trolley problem is usually taken to be, not the problem of explaining our differing 
verdicts about the footbridge and trolley driver dilemmas, but rather the problem of explaining our differing verdicts about the 
footbridge dilemma and a variant of the trolley driver dilemma in which you are a bystander who sees the runaway trolley and 
can hit a switch that will divert the trolley onto the sidetrack containing the one person. Indeed, Thomson (who introduced the 
term  “trolley  problem”  into  the  philosophical  lexicon)  thinks  there  is  no  problem  explaining  the  difference  in  our  intuitive 
reactions to the trolley driver and footbridge dilemmas; for Thomson (and for others following her), the real problem is explaining 
what grounds our different judgments about the bystander and footbridge dilemmas. And though Singer’s summary of Greene et 
al.’s research suggests that it was the bystander dilemma that was tested (see Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions,” p. 339), and though 
Greene himself, when describing his research, almost always summarizes the trolley driver dilemma in a way that is ambiguous 
between the driver and bystander variants (see Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation,” p. 2105; Greene et al., “Neural Bases,” 
p. 389; and Greene, “Secret Joke,” pp. 41-42), it is worth pointing out that in all of the published studies I discuss in this article, it 
was only the driver, not the bystander, version of the standard trolley dilemma that was studied. Perhaps it is being assumed that 
our judgments about the driver and bystander cases (and their neural correlates) will be the same; however, many philosophers 
mark a distinction between these two cases, and in her most recent discussion of the trolley problem (“Turning the Trolley,” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 36 [2008]: 359-74), Thomson argues that although it is permissible to divert the trolley if one is the 
driver, it is impermissible to divert the trolley if one is a bystander. (Thus, on Thomson’s current way of seeing things, there 
actually is no trolley problem, since the very formulation of that problem contains a false presupposition that there is a morally 
relevant difference between the bystander and footbridge cases, but no morally relevant difference between the bystander and 
driver cases.)   5 
classic trolley scenario for which that principle yields counterintuitive results. Thus as with the Gettier 
literature in epistemology and the causation and personal identity literatures in metaphysics, increasingly 
baroque  proposals  have  given  way  to  increasingly  complex  counterexamples,  and  though  some  have 
continued to struggle with the trolley problem, many others have simply given up and moved on to other 
topics.8 
  Rather than deal with the normative task of proposing principles that justify our responses to trolley-
like cases, Greene and his colleagues decided to pursue the descriptive task of investigating the physiological 
processes that underlie our responses to these sorts of cases. Their central empirical hypothesis requires 
making two distinctions: first a distinction between two different classes of moral judgments, and second a 
distinction between two different classes of psychological processes. The distinction between classes of 
moral judgments is as follows. Notice that a judgment that it is morally permissible to hit the switch in the 
trolley  driver  dilemma  is  precisely  the  sort  of  verdict  predicted  by  a  utilitarian  or,  more  generally, 
consequentialist moral framework: since one’s hitting the switch presumably results in a state of affairs 
with greater aggregate well-being than the state of affairs that would result were one not to hit the switch, 
according to most forms of consequentialism one is morally required—and hence permitted—to hit the 
switch. Following Greene, let us call particular-case moral judgments that, like the judgment that it is 
morally permissible to hit the switch in the trolley driver dilemma, are “easily justified in terms of the most 
basic  consequentialist  principles”  characteristically  consequentialist  judgments.9  One  judgment  that  is  not 
characteristically consequentialist is the judgment that it is morally impermissible to push the overweight 
individual to his demise in the footbridge dilemma: precisely what sets deontological moral theories apart 
from consequentialist ones is that deontological theories tend to yield the result that it is impermissible to 
kill another person in this way, even for the sake of “the greater good.” So, following Greene again, let us 
call particular-case moral judgments that, like the judgment that it is morally impermissible to push the 
                                                         
8   For a survey of the early classics of the trolley problem literature, see the papers collected in Fischer and Ravizza (eds.), 
Ethics: Problems and Principles. More recent classics not included in that anthology are Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), chap. 7; F. M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality, Vol. II: Rights, Duties, and Status 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), chaps. 6-7; and F. M. Kamm, Intricate Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
chaps. 1-6.  
9  Greene, “Secret Joke,” p. 39.   6 
obese  man  in  the  footbridge  dilemma,  are  “in  favor  of  characteristically  deontological  conclusions” 
characteristically deontological judgments.10 This gives us a two-fold distinction between types of particular-case 
moral  judgments,  which  is  usually  taken  to  correspond  to  a  two-fold  distinction  between  types  of 
particular-case moral intuitions.11 
  There are a number of reasons to be worried about this distinction between characteristically 
consequentialist and characteristically deontological moral judgments, but I want to put them aside for the 
time being so that we can get Greene et al.’s empirical hypothesis on the table. The second distinction 
upon which that hypothesis depends is a distinction between two kinds of psychological processes: emotional 
processes and “cognitive” processes. (Following Greene et al.’s useful convention,12 I use scare quotes when I 
mean “cognitive” to refer to specifically non-emotional information processing, in contrast to the also 
widespread  use  of  “cognitive”  to  refer  to  information  processing  in  general,  as  it  does  in  the  phrase 
“cognitive science.”) Exactly how to flesh out the emotional versus “cognitive” process distinction is a 
contentious  matter,  so  it  is  worth  noting  that  Greene  et  al.  use  “emotional  processing”  to  refer  to 
information processing that involves behaviorally valenced representations that trigger automatic effects 
and hence “have direct motivational force,”13 and they use “‘cognitive’ processing” to refer to information 
                                                         
10   Ibid. Note that these two definitions are not parallel. As Greene uses the expressions, “characteristically consequentialist 
judgment” means “judgment supported by the sort of moral principle that typically distinguishes consequentialist theories from 
deontological ones,” whereas “characteristically deontological judgment” means “judgment in favor of the sort of verdict that 
typically distinguishes deontological theories from consequentialist ones.” (The contrast is at the level of supporting principles in 
the  one  case,  at  the  level  of  particular  judgments  in  the  other.)  Thus  even  though  nearly  all  deontologists  judge  that  it  is 
permissible to divert the trolley in the trolley driver dilemma, such a judgment counts as characteristically consequentialist but 
does not count as characteristically deontological. 
11   In philosophical discussions of the metaphysics and epistemology of intuitions, there is an ongoing debate over whether 
intuitions just are judgments arrived at in a particular way (for example, not as a result of explicit reasoning, testimony, and so 
on), or whether intuitions are a separate class of mental entities that stand to intuitive judgments as perceptual experiences stand 
to  perceptual  judgments.  For  the  former  view,  see  Alvin  Goldman  and  Joel  Pust,  “Philosophical  Theory  and  Intuitional 
Evidence,” in Rethinking Intuition, ed. Michael R. DePaul and William Ramsey (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 
pp. 179-97; for the latter, see George Bealer, “Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy,” in the same volume, pp. 201-39. We 
need not take a stand on this debate here, since even if moral intuitions are separate entities over and above the moral judgments 
formed on their basis, there will usually be an intuitive moral judgment corresponding to each moral intuition. Thus either we 
can say (if we identify intuitions with intuitive judgments) that the experiments in question directly study our moral intuitions, or 
we can say (if we distinguish intuitions from intuitive judgments) that the experiments indirectly study our moral intuitions by 
collecting data on our moral judgments, which are taken to be tightly correlated with our moral intuitions. In what follows I will 
generally be fairly lax in sliding back and forth between talk of judgments and talk of intuitions. 
 (That said, I am not using “intuition” as that term is used in much of the psychology literature, where it refers to any sort of 
automatic, spontaneous “gut feeling” that one might have. See most of the studies cited in David G. Myers, Intuition: Its Powers and 
Perils [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002] for this sort of usage, which has little to do with what philosophers mean 
when they talk about intuitions.) 
12   See Greene et al., “Neural Bases,” p. 389; and Greene, “Secret Joke,” p. 40. 
13   Greene et al., “Neural Bases,” p. 397.   7 
processing  that  involves  “inherently  neutral  representations  .  .  .  that  do  not  automatically  trigger 
particular behavioral responses or dispositions.”14 Emotional processes tend to be fast and frugal (providing 
quick  responses  on  the  basis  of  a  limited  amount  of  information),  and  they  tend  to  be  domain-specific 
(responding  to  particular  subject  matters,  rather  than  any  subject  matter  in  general).  By  contrast, 
“cognitive” processes tend to be slow but flexible and domain-neutral, and it has been found that, at least in 
non-moral  cases,  “cognitive”  processes  are  recruited  for  such  things  as  abstract  reasoning,  problem 
solving, working memory, self-control, and higher executive functions more generally.15 Regions of the 
brain that have been associated with emotional processing include the following: the medial prefrontal 
cortex (Brodmann’s Area [BA] 9/10), the posterior cingulate/precuneus (BA 31/7), the posterior superior 
temporal  sulcus/inferior  parietal  lobe  (BA  39),  the  orbitofrontal/ventromedial  prefrontal  cortex  (BA 
10/11), and the amygdala. Regions of the brain that have been associated with “cognitive” processing 
include the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9/10/46) and the parietal lobe (BA 7/40). 
  Thus  we  have  a  two-fold  distinction  between  types  of  moral  judgments  (characteristically 
consequentialist ones vs. characteristically deontological ones) and a two-fold distinction between types of 
psychological processes (emotional ones vs. “cognitive” ones). The natural question to ask is: which sort 
(or sorts) of  processes  underlie each sort of judgment?  The  proposal put forward  by  Greene  and his 
colleagues is as follows: 
Greene et al.’s dual-process hypothesis:  Characteristically deontological judgments are driven 
by emotional processes, whereas characteristically consequentialist judgments are 
driven by “cognitive” processes, and these processes compete for one’s overall 
moral verdict about a given case.16 
In one way, this is an extremely old picture of how the moral mind works. The idea that reason and 
passion struggle for one’s overall moral stance was already commonplace by the time Hume wrote the 
Treatise. “Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of 
passion and reason,” Hume tells us (Treatise 2.3.3), before going on to argue against this Combat Model of 
                                                         
14   Greene, “Secret Joke,” p. 40. 
15   The qualification “at least  in non-moral cases” is crucial here: to say  at the outset that  “cognitive” processes handle 
abstract reasoning and problem solving in all domains (including the moral) is question begging. 
16   See Greene et al., “Neural Bases,” p. 398; Greene et al., “Cognitive Load,” p. 1145; and Greene, “Secret Joke,” pp. 40-41.   8 
the soul (as Christine Korsgaard usefully dubs it).17 So Greene et al.’s embracing of the Combat Model is 
not new.18 What is new, though, is the surprising twist that they give to that model. Whereas deontology is 
usually associated with reason and consequentialism with the sentiments, Greene and his colleagues claim 
that in fact the opposite is true. On their picture, when we contemplate hitting the switch in the trolley 
driver dilemma, our more “cognitive” brain processes perform a cool and detached cost-benefit analysis, 
yielding the verdict that it is permissible to hit the switch, but when we contemplate pushing the heavy 
fellow in the footbridge dilemma, our more emotional brain processes kick in and scream at us, “Don’t do 
that!” thus overriding the cost-benefit analysis that would have deemed it permissible to push the man. 
  Greene et al.’s dual-process hypothesis is an empirical hypothesis, and as such it yields a number 
of  empirical  predictions.  Here  I  mention  just  two.  First,  the  dual-process  hypothesis  predicts  that 
contemplation of cases like the footbridge dilemma should produce increased neural activity in regions of 
the  brain  associated  with  emotional  processes,  whereas  contemplation  of  cases  like  the  trolley  driver 
dilemma  should  produce increased neural  activity  in regions of the  brain associated  with “cognitive” 
processes. Second, the dual-process hypothesis predicts that people who reach a non-standard verdict 
about cases like the footbridge dilemma should take longer to reach their verdict than those who reach a 
standard verdict (since they are overriding an emotional response in order to come to their final verdict), 
whereas people who reach a non-standard verdict about cases like the trolley driver dilemma should take 
approximately  as long to  reach a verdict  as those  who reach  a  standard verdict (since no emotional 
response is being overridden). 
  Because the results from fMRI machines are statistically noisy, Greene and his colleagues could 
not test these  predictions simply by  comparing people’s reactions to the footbridge and trolley  driver 
dilemmas. Instead, they needed to compare the neural-activity and response-time results when people 
                                                         
17   See Christine Korsgaard, “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant,” Journal of Ethics 3 (1999): 1-29. Korsgaard 
contrasts the Combat Model of the soul with an alternate Constitution Model that she finds in Plato and Kant. 
18   Though perhaps it is new to empirical psychology: as Greene et al. tell the story (“Neural Bases,” pp. 397-98; “Cognitive 
Load,” p. 1145), empirical psychology went through a long period where, under the influence of Lawrence Kohlberg, it was 
widely believed that processes of reasoning underwrite the moral judgments of mature adults, followed by a more recent period in 
which Jonathan Haidt and others have proposed that moral judgments are primarily driven by automatic, emotional processes. 
See  Lawrence  Kohlberg,  “Stage  and  Sequence:  The  Cognitive-Developmental  Approach  to  Socialization,”  in  Handbook  of 
Socialization Theory and Research, ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 347-480; and Jonathan Haidt, “The 
Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review 108 (2001): 814-34.   9 
responded to a large number of cases that are “like the footbridge dilemma” (and hence give rise to 
deontological judgments) and a large number of cases that are “like the trolley driver dilemma” (and 
hence give rise to consequentialist judgments). But this leads to a problem: how do we sort the former class 
of dilemmas from the latter? Greene et al. settled on the following “purely descriptive”19 way of doing so: 
cases that are like the footbridge dilemma were deemed to involve harm that is brought about in an “up close and 
personal” way, whereas cases that are like the trolley driver dilemma were deemed to involve harm that is 
brought about in an impersonal way. What, though, does it mean for harm to be brought about in an “up close 
and personal” way? Here is Greene et al.’s “first cut” proposal: a moral dilemma counts as personal if and 
only if “the action in question (a) could reasonably be expected to lead to serious bodily harm (b) to a 
particular person or a member or members of a particular group of people (c) where this harm is not the 
result of deflecting an existing threat onto a different party.”20 The basic idea can be helpfully summarized 
in the slogan “ME HURT YOU”: 
The “HURT” criterion [= (a)] picks out the most primitive kinds of harmful violations (e.g., assault 
rather than insider trading) while the “YOU” criterion [= (b)] ensures that the victim be vividly 
represented as an individual. Finally, the “ME” criterion [= (c)] captures a notion of “agency,” 
requiring that the action spring in a direct way from the agent’s will, that it be “authored” rather 
than merely “edited” by the agent.21 
Moral dilemmas that were deemed by a set of independent coders to meet conditions (a), (b), and (c) were 
classified as personal moral dilemmas, and all other moral dilemmas were classified as impersonal moral dilemmas. 
Then,  working  under  the  assumption  that  the  personal  versus  impersonal  moral  dilemma  distinction 
tracks  the  dilemma-giving-rise-to-a-deontological-judgment  versus  dilemma-giving-rise-to-a-
consequentialist-judgment distinction, Greene et al. used this way of divvying up moral dilemmas into two 
piles to test their neural-activity and response-time predictions.  
  And what Greene and his colleagues found was truly remarkable. They had a number of subjects 
respond to approximately 20 personal moral dilemmas, approximately 20 impersonal moral dilemmas, 
                                                         
19   Greene, “Secret Joke,” p. 43. 
20   Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation,” p. 2107, n. 9. 
21   Greene et al., “Neural Bases,” p. 389.   10 
and approximately 20 non-moral dilemmas while inside fMRI machines.22 fMRI technology tracks the 
magnetic signature of oxygenated blood, which is widely taken to be a fairly accurate way of measuring 
the level of neural activity in different portions of the brain. Thus Greene et al. were able to test their 
predictions about neural activity. Moreover, they found that their predictions were largely borne out. 
When responding to personal moral dilemmas, subjects exhibited increased activity in the following brain 
areas  associated  with  emotional  processes:  the  medial  prefrontal  cortex,  the  posterior 
cingulate/precuneus, the posterior superior temporal sulcus/inferior parietal lobe, and the amygdala.23 
And  when  responding  to  impersonal  moral  dilemmas,  subjects  exhibited  increased  activity  in  two 
classically  “cognitive”  brain  regions,  the  dorsolateral  prefrontal  cortex  and  the  parietal  lobe.24 
Furthermore, during several trials Greene et al. measured their subjects’ response time to each question, 
and they reported that their response-time prediction was also confirmed: although subjects who gave 
emotionally incongruent answers to personal moral dilemmas took almost two seconds longer, on average, 
to respond than those who gave emotionally congruent responses, there was no comparable effect for 
impersonal moral dilemmas.25 All told, Greene et al.’s empirical results present an impressive case for 
their dual-process hypothesis.26 
                                                         
22   In experiment 1 in Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation,” nine subjects responded to 14 personal moral dilemmas, 19 
impersonal moral dilemmas, and 20 non-moral dilemmas, presented in random order, while inside fMRI machines. (For the 
exact wording of the dilemmas that were used, see the supplementary material at <http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/ 
full/sci;293/5537/2105/DC1/>.) Each dilemma was presented as three screens of text, after which the subject was required to 
give a verdict about the appropriateness of a proposed action by pressing one of two buttons (“appropriate” or “inappropriate”). 
Subjects were allowed to advance to each subsequent screen of text at their own rate, though they were given a maximum of 46 
seconds to read through all three screens and respond. In experiment 2 in that same article, nine different subjects responded to 
22 personal moral dilemmas, 19 impersonal moral dilemmas, and 20 non-moral dilemmas, using the same protocol. (The set of 
personal moral dilemmas was altered in experiment 2 to remove a possible confound in the experimental design: see p. 2108, 
n. 24.)  
  In  Greene  et  al.,  “Neural  Bases,”  32  new  subjects  responded  to  22  personal  moral  dilemmas,  18  impersonal  moral 
dilemmas, and 20 non-moral dilemmas, using the same protocol. (These were the same dilemmas used in experiment 2 of “An 
fMRI Investigation,” except one of the impersonal moral dilemmas was dropped.) The data from these new subjects together 
with the data from the nine subjects from experiment 2 in “An fMRI Investigation” were then analyzed together as a whole. 
23   See Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation,” p. 2106, fig. 1, and p. 2107; and Greene et al., “Neural Bases,” p. 391 and 
p. 392, table 1. The superior temporal sulcus was originally labeled “angular gyrus” in the first study. Activity in the amygdala 
was not detected in the first study but was detected in the larger second study. Due to a “magnetic susceptibility artifact,” neither 
study was able to image the orbitofrontal cortex, another brain area that has been associated with emotional processing (see 
Greene et al., “Neural Bases,” p. 2108, n. 21). 
24   See Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation,” p. 2106, fig. 1, and p. 2107; and Greene et al., “Neural Bases,” p. 391 and 
p. 392, table 1. 
25   See Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation,” p. 2107, fig. 3. 
26   In  the  body  of  this  article  I  have  focused  on  the  neuroimaging  and  response-time  findings,  since  these  results  are 
particularly vivid and tend to capture the public’s imagination. However, there have been a number of follow-up studies which   11 
III. Methodological Worries 
In general it is dangerous (and perhaps futile) for philosophers to resist empirically based challenges by 
calling into question the methodology of the relevant experiments, or the interpretation of their results. 
Not only are  philosophers often not  well trained at  evaluating scientific studies,  but they need  to  be 
extremely careful that the (alleged) design flaws to which they point are not ones that could easily be 
overcome in future research, or ones that in the end are irrelevant to the main philosophical issues at 
stake.27 Nevertheless, I think it is worth bringing up three empirical issues about Greene et al.’s research 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
have been taken to lend further support to Greene et al.’s dual-process hypothesis, including the following: 
•   In “Neural Bases,” Greene  et  al.  found that  when  subjects contemplated “difficult” personal moral dilemmas (where 
degree of difficulty was measured by response time), the anterior cingulate cortex (a brain region associated with conflict 
monitoring) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (a brain region associated with abstract reasoning) exhibited increased 
activity,  in addition to  regions  associated with emotion. They also found that the level of  activity in the  dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex was positively correlated with consequentialist responses to these “difficult” personal moral dilemmas. 
•   In a follow-up study, Greene and colleagues found that consequentialist responses to “difficult” personal moral dilemmas 
took longer when subjects were required to perform a cognitively intensive task at the same time as responding to the 
dilemmas, but deontological responses did not exhibit this effect. See Greene et al., “Cognitive Load.” 
•   Michael Koenigs, Liane Young, and colleagues found that patients with damage to their ventromedial prefrontal cortex (a 
brain region associated with the emotions) gave a greater percentage of consequentialist responses to the personal moral 
dilemmas from Greene et al.’s “An fMRI Investigation” than control subjects did. See Michael Koenigs, Liane Young, 
Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser, and Antonio Damasio, “Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex 
Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgments,” Nature 446 (2007): 908-11. 
•   Piercarlo Valdesolo and David DeSteno found that respondents who had watched a funny clip from Saturday Night Live 
were more likely to give a consequentialist response to the footbridge dilemma than those who had watched a clip from a 
dull documentary  beforehand,  but there was no comparable effect for the trolley driver dilemma. See Valdesolo and 
DeSteno, “Manipulations of Emotional Context Shape Moral Judgment,” Psychological Science 17 (2006): 476-77. 
27   One potential design worry about Greene et al.’s research that falls into the former category (i.e., worries that could easily 
be overcome in future research) is as follows. In order to have a comparison class for their neural-activity data, Greene and his 
colleagues had their subjects respond to a number of non-moral dilemmas, such as: 
turnips dilemma: “You are a farm worker driving a turnip-harvesting machine. You are approaching two diverging 
paths. 
By choosing the path on the left you will harvest ten bushels of turnips. By choosing the path on the right you will 
harvest twenty bushels of turnips. If you do nothing your turnip-harvesting machine will turn to the left. 
Is it appropriate for you to turn your turnip-picking machine to the right in order to harvest twenty bushels of 
turnips instead of ten?” (Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation,” supplementary material.) 
The trigger question here was formulated in terms of appropriateness to make it as parallel as possible to the trigger questions for 
the moral dilemmas tested, but one might worry that it sounds very odd to ask whether it is “appropriate” to turn a machine one 
way rather than the other. (Should we interpret this as some sort of prudential appropriateness? Is there even such a notion?) 
Moreover, the answer to this so-called dilemma is completely obvious, and all told I estimate that of the 20 non-moral dilemmas 
used  in Greene  et  al.’s studies, 12 have completely obvious answers, 6  are  somewhat less obvious, and only 2 are genuine 
dilemmas; thus one might worry that too many of these non-moral “dilemmas” have readily evident answers for them to serve as 
an accurate comparison class. However, both of these worries could easily be avoided in future research: the set of non-moral 
dilemmas could be altered to include a greater number of difficult dilemmas, and the trigger question for the dilemmas (both 
moral and non-moral) could be phrased in a less awkward way. (Indeed, in their “Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases 
Utilitarian Moral Judgments,” Koenigs et al. used Greene et al.’s dilemmas but rephrased the trigger questions so as to ask 
whether the subjects “would” perform the action in question, rather than asking whether they deem it “appropriate” to perform 
the action, perhaps for this very reason. However, this rewording introduces new problems, since one’s judgments about what one 
would do and one’s judgments about what it is morally permissible to do might pull apart.) 
  One potential design worry about Greene et al.’s research that falls into the latter category (i.e., worries that ultimately are   12 
before turning to the more important question of what, in principle, the normative implications of this sort 
of research could be. These three issues don’t entirely undermine the empirical findings, but they do cast 
them in a different light. Moreover, at least one of these issues will be crucial to our discussion of the 
normative implications of Greene et al.’s research. 
  First empirical  issue: neural activity in at least  one brain  region associated with emotion  was found to be 
correlated with consequentialist judgment. In particular, Greene and his colleagues found that activity in the 
posterior  cingulate,  a  portion  of  the  brain  known  to  be  recruited  for  emotional  processes,  predicts 
characteristically consequentialist responses to personal moral dilemmas (for example, a response that it is 
appropriate to push the portly gentleman in the footbridge dilemma).28 Greene et al. concede that these 
results  cast  doubt  on  the  simplest  version  of  the  dual-process  hypothesis,  according  to  which 
consequentialist judgments are wholly tied to “cognitive” processes and deontological judgments wholly 
tied to emotional processes. They write, “Like David Hume . . . we suspect that all action, whether driven 
by  ‘cognitive’  judgment or not,  must have  some affective  basis.”29 However,  what  is  at stake here is 
whether all moral judgment, not all action, has an affective basis. Also, Hume is a dangerous ally to call on at 
this point: Hume’s contention was not just that all moral judgments “have some emotional component,” 
as Greene at one point contends Hume’s view to be,30 but moreover that all moral judgments are entirely 
driven by the passions. On Hume’s picture, the struggle in our souls is not between reason and passion, 
with  a  few  passions  along  for  the  ride  on  reason’s  side;  rather,  the  fundamental  struggle  is  between 
different passions, with reason the underling carrying out each passion’s whims. “Reason is, and ought 
only to be slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” 
(Treatise 2.3.3) is not a slight amendment of the dual-process hypothesis; it is a complete subverting of it. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
not relevant to the philosophical issues at stake) is as follows. Because of the limitations of fMRI technology, Greene and his 
colleagues were only able to study neural activity when subjects contemplated hypothetical scenarios. Thus their dual-process 
hypothesis  has,  at  least  so  far,  not  been  tested  with  regards  to  moral  judgments  about  actual  scenarios  (whether  currently 
perceived or merely remembered). However, these limited results are enough for the philosophical questions at issue. Even if we 
could only conclude from Greene et al.’s research that deontological judgments about hypothetical cases are not trustworthy but 
could not make a parallel claim with regards to deontological judgments about actual cases, that would still be an extremely 
significant result, given the ubiquity of appeals to hypothetical cases in first-order moral theorizing. 
28   See Greene et al., “Neural Bases,” p. 395, table 4, and p. 397. 
29   Greene et al., “Neural Bases,” p. 397. 
30   Greene, “Secret Joke,” p. 41.   13 
  In  his  own  writings  Greene  tries  to  reinstate  a  contrast  between  the  processes  underlying 
deontological judgments and the processes underlying consequentialist judgments by proposing that the 
emotions  that  drive  deontological  judgments  are  “alarm-like,”  whereas  those  that  are  present  during 
consequentialist judgments are “more like a currency.”31 However, this alleged contrast appears to have 
no empirical backing, short of an appeal by Greene to his own phenomenology when he considers cases 
like the trolley driver and footbridge dilemmas. So in the end I think the best option for Greene and his 
colleagues  is  not  to  slide  into  a  full-blown  Humean  sentimentalism,  nor  to  posit  a  speculative  (and 
potentially  question-begging)  phenomenological  distinction  between  “alarm-like”  and  “currency-like” 
emotions, but rather to concede that at least one region of the brain traditionally associated with the 
emotions appears to be recruited for characteristically consequentialist judgments and then to insist that 
exactly how crucial a role this region plays in such judgments is a topic for future research. Their finding 
with regards to the posterior cingulate muddies the waters a bit, but it need not mean that the dual-
process hypothesis is completely off target. 
  Second empirical issue: when interpreted correctly, the response-time data collected by Greene et al. do not, in 
fact, confirm their prediction about comparative response times. Each of Greene et al.’s personal moral dilemmas was 
arranged so that a response in which the subject deems it “appropriate” to perform the proposed action 
(for  example,  appropriate  to  shove  the  hefty  stranger  in  the  footbridge  dilemma)  goes  against  the 
hypothesized  emotional  response,  and  a  response  in  which  the  subject  deems  it  “inappropriate”  to 
perform the proposed action (for example, inappropriate to shove the hefty stranger in the footbridge 
dilemma) is consonant with the hypothesized emotional response. In their original paper in Science, Greene 
et al. reported that responses of “appropriate” to their various personal moral dilemmas took on average 
6.8 seconds whereas responses of “inappropriate” took on average 5.0 seconds,32 and they took this to 
confirm their response-time prediction.33 However, this is a statistically invalid way of presenting these results. A 
more accurate way of presenting the results would be to calculate the average difference in response time 
                                                         
31   Greene, “Secret Joke,” p. 41; see also pp. 64-65. 
32   Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation,” p. 2107, fig. 3. 
33   Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation,” p. 2107.   14 
between  the  “appropriate”  responses  and  the  “inappropriate”  responses  for  each  question,  and  then  to 
calculate the average of these average differences. Such a way of calculating things prevents differences 
from question to question in the average response time and differences from question to question in the 
ratio of “appropriate” to “inappropriate” responses (two factors that should be irrelevant to the truth of 
the hypothesis being tested) from skewing the final results.34 
  As it turns out, this statistical point ends up mattering. The group of personal moral dilemmas 
that Greene and his colleagues tested were a motley bunch, including not only the footbridge dilemma, 
but also cases such as the following: 
architect dilemma: “You are a young architect visiting one of your construction sites with 
your  boss.  Your  boss  is  a  despicable  individual  who  makes  everyone  around  him 
miserable including you. 
It occurs to you that if you were to push him off the building you are inspecting he would 
fall to his death and everyone would think it was an accident. 
Is it appropriate for you to push your boss off of the building in order to get him out of 
your life?”35 
hired rapist dilemma: “You have been dissatisfied with your marriage for several years. It is 
your distinct impression that your wife no longer appreciates you. You remember how 
she appreciated you years ago when you took care of her after she was mugged. You 
devise the following plan to regain your wife’s affection. 
You will hire a man to break into your house while you are away. This man will tie up 
your wife and rape her. You, upon hearing the horrible news, will return swiftly to her 
side, to take care of her and comfort her, and she will once again appreciate you. 
Is it appropriate for you to hire a man to rape your wife so that she will appreciate you as 
you comfort her?”36 
So there is a worry that the difference between the average response times for all answers of “appropriate” 
and the average response time for all answers of “inappropriate” to personal moral dilemmas was largely 
due  to  the  fact  that  almost  all  respondents  very  quickly  answered  “inappropriate”  to  cases  like  the 
                                                         
34   To see how these factors could skew the results on Greene et al.’s way of calculating things, consider this. Suppose we took 
the personal moral dilemma that produced the greatest percentage of “appropriate” answers, and then added a large amount of 
filler text to the dilemma so as to increase by some set amount the response time for any answer to it. Then—assuming that this 
change does not affect the ratio of “appropriate” to “inappropriate” responses for that dilemma—our change will have raised the 
average of all answers of “appropriate” to personal moral dilemmas (Greene et al.’s proposed metric) quite a bit more than it raises the average 
of all answers of “inappropriate” to personal moral dilemmas. However, the average of the average differences in response time between “appropriate” 
and “inappropriate” response for each personal moral dilemma (my proposed metric) would be unaffected by such a change. 
35   Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation,” supplementary material. 
36   Ibid.   15 
architect and hired rapist cases, which are hardly deserving of the epithet “dilemma.” And this was indeed 
what happened: in a later paper, Greene et al. admit that when their response-time data are analyzed 
with cases like the architect and hired rapist cases thrown out, they reveal “no reliable differences in RT 
[response time]” between those who gave a response of “appropriate” and those who gave a response of 
“inappropriate” to personal moral dilemmas.37 
  I bring up this issue because in presenting the empirical case for the dual-process hypothesis, 
Singer and Greene lean quite heavily on the response-time data.38 Perhaps future research with larger 
sample sizes will confirm some version of the response-time prediction; however, it is important to keep in 
mind that at this point in time the response-time prediction has not been borne out, which in fact is an 
empirical strike against the dual-process hypothesis.39 
  Third empirical issue: Greene et al.’s tentative criteria for sorting personal from impersonal moral dilemmas are 
an inadequate way of tracking the dilemma-giving-rise-to-a-deontological-moral-judgment versus dilemma-giving-rise-to-a-
consequentialist-moral-judgment  distinction.  To  claim  that  characteristically  deontological  judgments  only 
concern  bodily  harms  is  nothing  short  of  preposterous;  after  all,  the  stock  in  trade  of  deontology  is 
supposed to involve not just prohibitions on murder and mayhem, but also requirements against lying, 
promise-breaking,  coercion,  and  the  like.40  But  even  within  the  realm  of  bodily  harms,  there  are  an 
                                                         
37   Greene et al., “Cognitive Load,” p. 1146, n. 5. Actually, when they concede this, Greene et al. are worried about a slightly 
different issue: here they are worried that cases such as the architect and hired rapist dilemmas should not be included in the 
analysis,  since  an  answer  of  “appropriate”  to  such  dilemmas  does  not  correspond  (or  does  not  obviously  correspond)  to  a 
consequentialist judgment about such a case. Though I share this worry (see my third empirical issue, below), my point here is 
somewhat different. Even if we toss out the response-time data from the architect and hired rapist dilemmas, it is still statistically 
invalid to compare the average response time of every answer of “appropriate” to the average response time of every answer of 
“inappropriate,”  rather  than  averaging  the  average  differences  in  response  time  between  answers  of  “appropriate”  and 
“inappropriate” for each question. 
   It is not clear to me whether Greene et al. now realize this point. On the one hand, in a more recent study in which they 
compare subjects’ response times when responding to moral dilemmas while performing a cognitively intensive task (see n. 26), 
Greene et al. continue to present their response-time data in the statistically invalid manner (see Greene et al., “Cognitive Load,” 
p. 1149, fig. 1, and p. 1150, fig. 2). On the other hand, they write in that same study, “This general pattern also held when item, 
rather than participant, was modeled as a random effect, though the results in this analysis were not as strong” (ibid., p. 1149).  
38   See Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions,” pp. 341-42; and Greene, “Secret Joke,” p. 44. See also Greene, “Reply to Mikhail and 
Timmons,” in Moral Psychology, Vol. 3, pp. 105-17, at p. 109. 
39   Recently, three psychologists and one philosopher have reanalyzed Greene et al.’s data from “An fMRI Investigation” and 
definitively  established  that  Greene  et  al.’s  response-time  prediction  was,  in  fact,  disconfirmed  by  that  data.  See  Jonathan 
McGuire, Robyn Langdon, Max Coltheart, and Catriona Mackenzie, “A Reanalysis of the Personal/Impersonal Distinction in 
Moral Psychology Research,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45 (2009): 577-80.  
40   Of course, exactly how we cash out these prohibitions/requirements will vary from one deontological theory to the next. 
(That said, it is important to keep in mind that a Ten-Commandments-style “Never, ever kill!” “Never, ever lie!” etc. version of 
deontology is not the only option; indeed, such a picture is rarely, if ever, defended outside of introductory ethics courses.)   16 
abundance of clear counterexamples to Greene et al.’s proposal. To mention just one: Frances Kamm’s 
famous lazy Susan case is a dilemma giving rise to a consequentialist moral judgment, but it is deemed a 
personal moral dilemma by Greene et al.’s tripartite “ME HURT YOU” criteria. In this case, a runaway 
trolley is heading toward five innocent people who are seated on a giant lazy Susan. The only way to save 
the five people is to push the lazy Susan so that it swings the five out of the way; however, doing so will 
cause the lazy Susan to ram into an innocent bystander, killing him.41 Kamm’s intuition about this case is 
characteristically consequentialist: she thinks it is permissible to push the lazy Susan, thereby killing the 
one to save the five. However, in doing so one would initiate a new threat (ME) that causes serious bodily 
harm (HURT) to a person (YOU), so this case counts as a personal moral dilemma according to Greene et 
al.’s criteria. Thus Greene et al.’s crucial assumption that we can establish a claim about the psychological 
processes  underlying  deontological  and  consequentialist  judgments  by  testing  the  differing  processes 
utilized to think about personal versus impersonal moral dilemmas is seriously called into question. 
  Actually, matters are even worse than that. What we really have are three distinctions: (i) the 
distinction between moral dilemmas that typically elicit a characteristically deontological reaction and 
those that typically elicit a characteristically consequentialist reaction; (ii) the distinction between moral 
dilemmas that intuitively involve harm brought about in an “up close and personal” way and those that 
do not; and (iii) the distinction between moral dilemmas that satisfy Greene et al.’s “ME  HURT  YOU” 
criteria and those that do not. The problem is that none of these distinctions matches up with the others. 
We  have  already  seen  how  Kamm’s  lazy  Susan  case  shows  that  distinction  (i)  is  not  distinction  (iii). 
Kamm’s case also shows why distinction (i) is not distinction (ii): killing someone by ramming a giant lazy 
Susan tray into him presumably counts as harming that person in an “up close and personal” manner, yet 
this case is one that gives rise to a characteristically consequentialist judgment. Moreover, there are a 
variety  of  cases  that  show  that  distinction  (ii)  is  not  distinction  (iii).  Most  famously,  a  variant  of  the 
footbridge case in which there is a trapdoor under the fat man that you can trigger from afar intuitively 
counts as a case in which someone is not harmed in an “up close and personal” way, yet such a case is 
deemed to be a personal moral dilemma by the “ME HURT YOU” criteria, since triggering the trapdoor 
                                                         
41   Kamm, Morality, Mortality, Vol. II: Rights, Duties, and Status, p. 154.   17 
initiates a new threat (ME) that causes serious bodily harm (HURT) to a specific individual (YOU).42 So all 
three of these distinctions pull apart.43 
  Greene et al. were never under any delusions that their initial proposal for sorting cases that are 
like the footbridge dilemma from cases that are like the standard trolley dilemma was fully adequate; after 
all, they explicitly called it a “first cut” proposal.44 And Greene himself now admits that their proposal 
“does not work” and “is clearly wrong.”45 Greene and his colleagues consider it a task for future research 
to determine the proper way of characterizing the distinction that they tried to capture with the “ME 
HURT YOU” criteria.46 
  So  where  does  this  leave  us?  Even  if  some  emotional  processes  are  tied  to  consequentialist 
judgment, and even if Greene et al.’s response-time prediction does not hold up, and even if their way of 
mapping  the  deontological  versus  consequentialist  judgment  distinction  onto  the  personal  versus 
impersonal dilemma distinction is in need of revision, nonetheless Greene et al.’s neural-activity results 
strongly suggest that something like the dual-process hypothesis may well be true, though perhaps in a 
modified form.47 The question to which I would like to now turn is: what follows from these findings? 
                                                         
42   If you doubt that the ME criterion holds in this case, keep in mind that it is usually a standard feature of the footbridge case 
and its variants that the fall is what kills the fat man, whose body then serves as a weight to slow down the runaway trolley. 
43   In the body of this article I have appealed to Kamm’s lazy Susan case in order to argue that the personal dilemma versus 
impersonal dilemma distinction (whether construed intuitively or in terms of the “ME HURT YOU” criteria) is not the dilemma-
typically-giving-rise-to-a-deontological-judgment  versus  dilemma-typically-giving-rise-to-a-consequentialist-judgment distinction. 
I chose to use Kamm’s case since it is familiar from the trolley problem literature. However, a slightly cleaner version of the same 
case that would equally well serve my purposes is as follows: instead of being on a lazy Susan, the five innocent people are on a 
dolly (i.e., a wheeled platform) that you can push out of the way of the oncoming trolley, but doing so will cause the dolly to roll 
down a hill and smash an innocent bystander to death. (Note that in order for either of these cases to be a counterexample to 
Greene et al.’s proposal, it is not necessary that everyone makes a characteristically consequentialist judgment about such a case; all 
we need is for a characteristically consequentialist judgment to be the standard reply.) 
   Kamm notes that lazy Susan cases raise difficulties for Greene et al.’s personal versus impersonal distinction in her Intricate 
Ethics, pp. 142-43 and p. 180, n. 34; Greene concedes the point in his “Reply to Mikhail and Timmons,” p. 108. See also p. 43, 
n. 37, and p. 418 of Intricate Ethics, where Kamm discusses a second sort of case that poses problems for that distinction. 
44   Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation,” p. 2107. 
45   Greene, “Reply to Mikhail and Timmons,” pp. 107, 114. 
46   Further evidence of the inadequacy of Greene et al.’s “ME HURT YOU” criteria is provided by Guy Kahane and Nicholas 
Shackel,  “Do  Abnormal  Responses  Show  Utilitarian  Bias?”  Nature  452:7185  (2008):  E5-E6.  Kahane  and  Shackel  had  five 
professional moral philosophers categorize the moral dilemmas from Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation,” and they found that 
only 5 out of the 19 personal moral dilemmas used in both experiments (26%) and only 10 out of the 22 impersonal moral 
dilemmas  used  in  experiment  2  (45%)  were  deemed  by  a  majority  of  these  philosophers  to  involve  a  choice  in  which  a 
deontological option is contrasted with a consequentialist option. The data from Kahane and Shackel’s study can be found at 
<http://ethics-etc.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/dilemma-classification.pdf>. 
47   What about the additional studies that have been taken to lend further support to the dual-process hypothesis (see n. 26)? 
Here, too, I think the empirical upshot is far from certain. Some worries about those studies: 
•   In “Neural Bases,” Greene et al. took activity in the anterior cingulate cortex during contemplation of “difficult” personal   18 
IV. Normative Implications: Three Bad Arguments 
Greene  and  Singer  think  that  quite  a  lot  follows  from  Greene  et  al.’s  experimental  findings.48  In 
particular,  they  think  that  these  findings  give  us  good  reason  to  conclude  that  characteristically 
deontological moral intuitions should not be trusted. Moreover, they think that these findings impugn the 
epistemic credentials of characteristically deontological moral intuitions without impugning the epistemic 
credentials of characteristically consequentialist moral intuitions.  
  Both  Singer  and  Greene  draw  further  conclusions  from  their  claim  about  the  comparative 
epistemic standing of deontological and consequentialist intuitions. Revisiting an old debate with Rawls,49 
Singer argues that the untrustworthiness of deontological moral intuitions also shows that the method of 
reflective  equilibrium  is  fundamentally  misguided.50  And  Greene  argues  that,  in  addition,  the 
untrustworthiness of deontological  moral intuitions shows that all  deontologists—even those  who, like 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
moral dilemmas to provide evidence that there was a conflict between two subsystems in the brain. However, as they 
themselves note (p. 395), the exact function of the anterior cingulate cortex is not currently known, and the hypothesis that 
it is devoted to conflict monitoring is just one among several. 
•   While it is true that in “Cognitive Load” Greene et al. found that consequentialist responses to “difficult” personal moral 
dilemmas took longer when the subjects were performing a cognitively intensive task at the same time (as the dual-process 
hypothesis predicts), they did not find that subjects gave a lower percentage of consequentialist responses when performing 
the cognitively intensive task (as the dual-process hypothesis would also predict). Greene et al. try to explain away this 
troubling piece of counter-evidence by speculating that the subjects were “trying to push through” the interference caused 
by the cognitively intensive task (Greene et al., “Cognitive Load,” p. 1151), but as Adina Roskies and Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong  note,  “this  story  makes  sense  only  if  subjects  knew  in  advance  that  they  wanted  to  reach  a  utilitarian 
judgment.” See Roskies and Sinnott-Armstrong, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Thinking about Morality,” Scientific 
American Mind 19 (2008), <http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=thinking-about-morality>. 
•   Jorge Moll and Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza raise some doubts as to whether Koenigs et al.’s data in their “Damage to the 
Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgments” on patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
really support Greene et al.’s dual-process hypothesis. Among other worries, Moll and de Oliveira-Souza point out that 
these patients also had damage to the anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a more “cognitive” portion of the brain that 
Greene et al. found to be correlated with consequentialist judgment in “An fMRI Investigation” and “Neural Bases,” so 
these patients are not clean cases in which only emotional processing is impaired. See Moll and de Oliveira-Souza, “Moral 
Judgments, Emotions, and the Utilitarian Brain,” Trends in Cognitive Science 11 (2007): 319-21, and “Response to Greene: 
Moral Sentiments and Reason: Friends or Foes?” Trends in Cognitive Science 11 (2007): 323-24. For Greene’s reply, see his 
“Why Are VMPFC Patients More Utilitarian? A Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgment Explains,” Trends in Cognitive 
Science 11 (2007): 322-23. See also Kahane and Shackel, “Do Abnormal Responses Show Utilitarian Bias?” 
More importantly, though, it is dialectically problematic first to appeal to patients with damage to emotional brain 
regions when making an empirical case for the dual-process hypothesis and then to go on to argue that the verdicts of these 
brain regions should be neglected (in effect urging us to be more like these patients), since many patients with this sort of 
brain damage make moral decisions in their personal lives that count as disastrous when evaluated by just about any 
plausible  normative  standard  (see  Antonio  Damasio,  Descartes’  Error:  Emotion,  Reason,  and  the  Human  Brain  [New  York: 
Putnam, 1994]). So even if studies of such brain-damaged patients end up supporting the dual-process hypothesis, they 
threaten to do so only at the cost of making Greene’s and Singer’s normative claims less tenable.  
48   See Greene, “From Neural ‘Is’ to Moral ‘Ought’”; Greene, “Secret Joke”; and Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions.” 
49   See Peter Singer, “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium,” The Monist 58 (1974): 490-517. 
50   Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions,” pp. 343-49.   19 
Kant,51 don’t explicitly rely on particular-case moral intuitions in their moral theorizing—are rationalizers 
who construct flimsy post hoc justifications for the very verdicts that they would be led by their emotions to 
make anyway.52 I won’t be discussing either of these additional arguments here, since they both obviously 
depend  on  the  antecedent  claim  that  we  have  good  reason  to  discount  deontological  but  not 
consequentialist particular-case moral intuitions.53 
  Before  turning  to  Greene’s  and  Singer’s  central  argument  against  the  probative  force  of 
deontological intuitions, though, I want to briefly discuss three bad arguments for that conclusion. On a 
charitable interpretation of Greene and Singer, these are arguments that they don’t actually make but 
which it is extremely tempting to see them as making; on an uncharitable interpretation of Greene and 
Singer, these are bad arguments that they sloppily mix in with their main argument. My guess is that the 
truth lies somewhere in between: although Greene’s and Singer’s primary and most promising line of 
argumentation does not rely on these three arguments, I think they occasionally give their main argument 
more  rhetorical  force  by  invoking  versions  of  these  arguments.  So  it  is  worth  showing  just  how 
unconvincing  these  three  arguments  are  before  we  consider  Singer’s  and  Greene’s  main  reason  for 
thinking  that  Greene  et  al.’s  neuroscientific  research  gives  us  good  reason  to  privilege  our 
characteristically consequentialist intuitions over our characteristically deontological ones. 
  The crudest possible argument for the conclusion reached by both Greene and Singer would 
proceed as follows: 
the “emotions bad, reasoning good” argument: 
  P.  Deontological  intuitions  are  driven  by  emotions,  whereas  consequentialist 
intuitions involve abstract reasoning. 
  C.  So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, do not have any 
genuine normative force. 
                                                         
51   On  one  interpretation  of  Kant,  although  he  appeals  to  particular-case  intuitions  about  the  conditions  under  which 
something is good in the opening paragraphs of Groundwork I, he takes himself to have discharged any appeal to particular-case 
moral intuitions once he has completed his argument for the form and existence of the Categorical Imperative by the end of 
Groundwork III. 
52   Greene, “Secret Joke,” pp. 66-72. 
53   For a reply to Singer’s “Ethics and Intuitions” that focuses on the question of whether Greene et al.’s research poses 
problems for the method of reflective equilibrium, see Folke Tersman, “The Reliability of Moral Intuitions: A Challenge from 
Neuroscience,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 389-405. However, to my mind Tersman is too quick to concede to 
Greene and Singer that Greene et al.’s research might demonstrate that deontological moral intuitions are unreliable; his main 
point is that even if this is so, the method of wide reflective equilibrium can take this fact into account.   20 
This is a bad argument. We need a substantive reason for thinking that intuitions based in emotion are 
less likely to be reliable than those based in “reasoning” for this argument to be at all convincing. After all, 
there is a venerable tradition that sees emotions as an important way of discerning normative truths.54 
One might disagree with this tradition, but showing that it rests on a mistake requires more than mere 
name-calling. Furthermore, even if the above argument were anything less than a howler, Greene et al.’s 
findings with regards to the posterior cingulate would cause additional problems for the argument. If 
consequentialist intuitions also recruit emotional processes, the pernicious influence of the emotions can 
hardly be used to drive an epistemic wedge between deontological and consequentialist intuitions.55  
  One natural way of improving on the “emotions bad, reasoning good” argument would involve 
arguing as follows: 
the argument from heuristics: 
  P1.  Deontological  intuitions  are  driven  by  emotions,  whereas  consequentialist 
intuitions involve abstract reasoning. 
  P2.  In  other  domains,  emotional  processes  tend  to  involve  fast  and  frugal  (and 
hence unreliable) heuristics. 
  C1.  So,  in  the  moral  domain,  the  emotional  processes  that  drive  deontological 
intuitions involve fast and frugal (and hence unreliable) heuristics. 
  C2.  So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, are unreliable. 
This is also not the best argument. Usually when we deem something to be a heuristic, we have a good 
handle on what the right and wrong answers in the relevant domain are; this is certainly the case in most 
of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s well-known examples of heuristics for logical and probabilistic 
reasoning. However, in the moral case it is very much up for debate what the right and wrong answers 
are. So it is question begging to assume that the emotional processes underwriting deontological intuitions 
consist  in  heuristics.  Or  more  precisely:  it  is  question begging to  assume  that just  because  emotional 
processes in other domains consist in heuristics, therefore emotional processes in the moral domain consist 
                                                         
54   For  contemporary  expressions  of  this  sentiment,  see  Robert  C.  Solomon,  The  Passions  (Garden  City,  N.Y.:  Anchor 
Press/Doubleday, 1976); Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987); Patricia Greenspan, 
Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification (New York: Routledge, 1988); Michael Stocker, with Elizabeth Hegeman, 
Valuing Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Bennett Helm, Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the 
Nature of Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of 
Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
55   And replacing the “emotions bad, reasoning good” argument with an “alarm-like emotions bad, currency-like emotions 
plus  reasoning  good”  argument  is  clearly  no  dialectical  improvement  either,  unless  something  substantive  is  said  about  why 
currency-like emotions are less problematic than alarm-like ones.   21 
in heuristics. How can we proclaim these emotional processes to be quick but sloppy shortcuts for getting 
at the moral truth unless we already have a handle on what the moral truth is?56 
  I have just identified the inference from P1 and P2 to C1 as the major problem with the argument 
from heuristics. However, it is worth briefly mentioning two additional problems with the argument. First, 
it is a matter of some dispute whether premise P2 is even true. A number of authors have argued that, in 
the non-moral domain, the fast  and frugal heuristics underwriting emotional  processes  are often  more 
reliable than their slow but flexible counterparts involving deliberate reasoning.57 Second, the inference 
from C1 to C2 is also questionable. After all, it is doubtful that our mental machinery computes all of the 
actual and expected consequences of an action whenever we make a characteristically consequentialist 
judgment about it. So even if the neural processes underlying deontological intuitions rely upon heuristics, 
it is likely that the neural processes underlying consequentialist intuitions also make use of heuristics.58 All 
told, the argument from heuristics faces serious and, to my mind, fatal problems.59 
  The first two arguments I have just considered involve fixing on the emotional nature of the 
processes  that,  according  to  the  dual-process  hypothesis,  underlie  deontological  judgments;  the  third 
argument I want to consider takes a different tack. Greene and Singer motivate their main argument by 
telling a “just so” story  about the evolution of our faculty for making  deontological judgments  about 
personal moral dilemmas. Here is Greene’s version of that story: 
The rationale for distinguishing between personal and impersonal forms of harm is largely 
evolutionary. “Up close and personal” violence has been around for a very long time, 
reaching back into our primate lineage . . . . Given that personal violence is evolutionarily 
ancient, predating our recently evolved human capacities for complex abstract reasoning, 
it should come as no surprise if we have innate responses to personal violence that are 
                                                         
56   Cass Sunstein makes a similar point in “Moral Heuristics,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2005): 531-73, at pp. 533-34. 
57   Gerd Gigerenzer has been arguing this point for several decades now. See, among other places, his “Moral Intuition = 
Fast and Frugal Heuristics?” in Moral Psychology, Vol. 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, ed. Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008), pp. 1-26. John Allman and James Woodward also provide a number of nice 
examples from the psychology literature in which the utilization of automatic, emotional processes seems to result in better non-
moral decisions than the utilization of more cognitive, deliberative processes. See Woodward and Allman, “Moral Intuition: Its 
Neural Substrates and Normative Significance,” Journal of Physiology-Paris 101 (2007): 179-202, at pp. 189-91, 195-96; and Allman 
and  Woodward,  “What  Are  Moral  Intuitions  and  Why  Should  We  Care  about  Them?  A  Neurobiological  Perspective,” 
Philosophical Issues 18 (2008): 164-85, at pp. 170-71, 174. 
58   I am grateful to Louis Menand for this point. 
59   Another complication: in formulating the  argument from heuristics, I have assumed that heuristics  are, by  definition, 
unreliable. However, as Frances Kamm has reminded me, this assumption is strictly speaking false. For example, the rule “Add 
up all the digits and see if the result is divisible by 3” is a useful heuristic for determining whether a natural number is divisible by 
3, but it is also perfectly reliable.   22 
powerful  but  rather  primitive.  That  is,  we  might  expect  humans  to  have  negative 
emotional  responses  to  certain  basic  forms  of  interpersonal  violence . . . .  In  contrast, 
when a  harm is impersonal, it should fail  to trigger this  alarm-like emotional response, 
allowing people to respond in a more “cognitive” way, perhaps employing a cost-benefit 
analysis.60 
Similarly, Singer writes, 
For most of our evolutionary history, human beings have lived in small groups . . . . In 
these  groups,  violence  could  only  be  inflicted  in  an  up-close  and  personal  way—by 
hitting,  pushing,  strangling,  or  using  a  stick  or  stone  as  a  club.  To  deal  with  such 
situations,  we  have  developed  immediate,  emotionally  based  responses  to  questions 
involving close, personal interactions with others.61 
In light of their appeal to such an evolutionary story, it is very tempting to read both Greene and Singer 
as making something like the following argument: 
the argument from evolutionary history: 
  P.  Our emotion-driven  deontological  intuitions  are evolutionary  by-products that 
were adapted to handle an environment we no longer find ourselves in. 
  C.  So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, do not have any 
genuine normative force. 
However, this is another bad argument. Presumably consequentialist intuitions are just as much a product 
of evolution—whether directly or indirectly—as deontological intuitions are, so an appeal to evolutionary 
history gives us no reason to privilege consequentialist intuitions over deontological ones. At one point 
Singer contends that consequentialist intuitions “[do] not seem to be . . . the outcome of our evolutionary 
past,”62 but I find this claim rather hard to believe. And at one point Greene declares that “it is unlikely 
that inclinations that evolved as evolutionary  by-products correspond to some independent, rationally 
discoverable moral truth,” without realizing that such a claim poses as much a problem for the epistemic 
efficacy of consequentialist inclinations as it does for the epistemic efficacy of deontological inclinations.63 
In fact, a crass evolutionary argument of this sort poses problems for more than that. Anyone drawing 
normative implications from scientific findings is committed to mathematical and scientific judgments 
                                                         
60   Greene, “Secret Joke,” p. 43. 
61   Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions,” pp. 347-48. (Actually, it is somewhat controversial whether the emotional underpinnings 
of our moral judgments have been retained in relatively unchanged form since our early ancestors. For some empirical evidence 
that this might not be so, see Woodward and Allman, “Moral Intuition: Its Neural Substrates and Normative Significance,” 
pp. 183, 187-88.) 
62   Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions,” p. 350. 
63   Greene, “Secret Joke,” p. 72.   23 
having  genuine  normative  force,  yet  presumably  our  faculty  for  making  such  judgments  also  has  an 
evolutionary  basis. Sensing this  sort of worry,  Singer calls for  us to engage  in “the ambitious task of 
separating those moral judgments that we owe to our evolutionary basis and cultural history, from those 
that have a rational basis.”64 However, this is clearly a false dichotomy. 
  Richard Joyce and Sharon Street offer more careful versions of the argument from evolutionary 
history, yet their conclusion is that all of our moral judgments are unjustified (Joyce), or that all of our 
value  judgments  would  be  unjustified  if  certain  realist  conceptions  of  value  were  true  (Street).65  The 
crucial premise in both Joyce’s and Street’s argument is that moral judgments/intuitions don’t need to be 
truth-tracking in order to conduce toward reproductive fitness, or at least that on a realist construal of 
what they amount to they don’t need to; it is this premise that gives Joyce and Street some hope of 
undercutting the epistemic status of moral judgments without also undercutting the epistemic status of 
mathematical and scientific judgments. So maybe one could argue that although deontological intuitions 
don’t need to be truth-tracking in order to conduce toward reproductive fitness, consequentialist intuitions 
do, and in this way resuscitate the argument from evolutionary history. However: it is far from clear how 
this additional piece of argumentation would go. Also: now all the work in the argument is being done by 
armchair  theorizing  about  the  connection  between  being  truth-tracking  and  being  evolutionarily 
beneficial; the neuroscientific results have completely dropped out of the picture.66 
V. Normative Implications: A Better Argument 
Now that we have set aside three bad, but tempting, arguments for why Greene et al.’s neuroscientific 
findings  have  normative  implications,  we  can  consider  Greene  and  Singer’s  main  argument  for  that 
conclusion. The crucial move they make is to insist that if Greene et al.’s research is correct, then our 
                                                         
64   Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions,” p. 351. 
65   Richard Joyce, The Myth of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chap. 6; Richard Joyce, The Evolution 
of Morality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006); and Sharon Street, “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” 
Philosophical Studies 127 (2006): 109-66. 
66   Moreover, even if Greene and Singer could somehow adapt Joyce’s and Street’s arguments for their purposes, there is 
another  reason why I  don’t think this strategy  would  work: I don’t believe that Joyce’s  and Street’s original versions of the 
evolutionary  argument  are  convincing.  I  argue  for  this  claim  in  a  companion  piece  to  this  article  titled  “The  Metaethical 
Irrelevance of Evolutionary Theory.”   24 
deontological intuitions are responding to factors that are morally irrelevant, and as such should not be trusted. 
This suggests the following argument: 
the argument from morally irrelevant factors: 
  P1.  The emotional processing that gives rise to deontological intuitions responds to 
factors that make a dilemma personal rather than impersonal. 
  P2.  The factors that make a dilemma personal rather than impersonal are morally 
irrelevant. 
  C1.  So, the emotional processing that gives rise to deontological intuitions responds 
to factors that are morally irrelevant. 
  C2.  So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, do not have any 
genuine normative force. 
When  summarizing  his  central  argument,  Greene  writes,  “There  are  good  reasons  to  think  that  our 
distinctively deontological moral intuitions . . . reflect the influence of morally irrelevant factors and are 
therefore unlikely to track the moral truth.”67 And when responding to a commentator on that article, 
Greene adds, “I have .  . . argued that  these  [deontological] judgments can  be explained in terms of 
patterns of emotional response and that these patterns reflect the influence of morally irrelevant factors.”68 
Similarly, Singer writes, 
If . . . Greene is right to suggest that our intuitive responses are due to differences in the 
emotional pull of situations that involve bringing about someone’s death in a close-up, 
personal way, and bringing about the same person’s death in a way that is at a distance, 
and  less  personal,  why  should  we  believe  that  there  is  anything  that  justifies  these 
responses? . . . [W]hat is the moral salience of the fact that I have killed someone in a way 
that was possible a million years ago, rather than in a way that became possible only two 
hundred years ago? I would answer: none.69 
And elsewhere in that same article, Singer insists that “there are no morally relevant differences” between 
the trolley driver and footbridge dilemmas, which is why we should ignore our emotional responses to the 
latter sort of dilemma.70 
  What are we to make of the argument from morally irrelevant factors? The first thing to note is 
                                                         
67   Greene, “Secret Joke,” pp. 69-70. 
68   Greene, “Reply to Mikhail and Timmons,” p. 117. See also Greene, “Secret Joke,” p. 70, where he refers to “contingent, 
non-moral feature[s]”; Greene, “Secret Joke,” p. 75, where he again refers to “morally irrelevant factors”; and Greene, “Reply to 
Mikhail and Timmons,” p. 116, where he refers to “arbitrary  features”  in the course of arguing that  deontologists  suffer  a 
“garbage in, garbage out” problem. 
69   Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions,” pp. 347, 348. 
70   Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions,” p. 350.   25 
that, as Greene and Singer both admit,71 premise P2 in this argument appeals to a substantive normative 
intuition, which presumably one must arrive at from the armchair, rather than directly read off from any 
experimental results; this is why the argument does not derive an “ought” from an “is.” I believe that this 
feature is a virtue of the argument; however, it is also its ultimate undoing. In what follows, I mention four 
worries that I have about the argument from morally irrelevant factors, in order of increasing significance. 
  First worry: since Greene et al.’s initial characterization of the personal vs. impersonal dilemma 
distinction  does not  track the  gives-rise-to-a-deontological-judgment vs.  gives-rise-to-a-consequentialist-
judgment distinction, it is far from clear that premise P1 is true. Greene thinks that the eventual account 
of the features to which the deontological moral faculty is responding will have something to do with 
“personalness,”  broadly  construed,72  but  I  have  my  doubts.73  Moreover,  any  attempt  to  precisely 
characterize the features that give rise to distinctively deontological judgments reintroduces many of the 
intricacies of the original trolley problem: formulating a principle that distinguishes what separates cases-
eliciting-a-deontological-judgment  from  cases-eliciting-a-consequentialist-judgment  is  likely  to  be  as 
                                                         
71   See Greene, “Secret Joke,” pp. 66-67; and Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions,” p. 347.  
72   Greene, “Reply to Mikhail and Timmons,” p. 112. 
73   In a more recent study (Joshua D. Greene, Fiery Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom, and 
Jonathan  D. Cohen, “Pushing  Moral Buttons: The Interaction between Personal  Force and Intention in Moral Judgment,” 
Cognition 111 [2009]: 364-71), Greene and his colleagues claim to have discovered that what explains people’s moral judgments 
about footbridge-like cases is whether the agent’s action intentionally harms someone through the use of what they call personal force, 
which is present when “the force that directly impacts the victim is generated by the agent’s muscles” (p. 364). However, there are 
a number of problems with the study. For instance, many of the contrasting cases have a variety of differences beyond those 
identified as candidate explanatory factors, and a number of obvious potential counterexamples to their proposal were not tested 
(for example, do people judge it just as morally unacceptable to force the man off the footbridge by menacing him with a knife, or 
by threatening to harm his family, or by tricking him into taking a step backwards?). But, ironically, the biggest problem with the 
study is that Greene et al. seem to have identified, without realizing it, a competing explanation for their respondents’ verdicts. 
Greene et al. gathered evidence about the degree to which their respondents unconsciously filled in more realistic assumptions 
when imagining the scenarios in question, and they found a high degree of correlation between a tendency to refuse to assume 
that it was absolutely certain that the five would be saved if the one is killed and a tendency to judge that such a course of action is 
morally unacceptable (pp. 367-68). So, by their own lights, not all of their subjects were responding to the same scenario, and the 
variation in responses can be partially explained by the variation in assumptions about the likelihood of the proposed action 
succeeding. (I suspect that varying assumptions  about the degree to which the man on the footbridge might resist, thereby 
endangering the life of the agent trying to harm him, could also go a long way toward explaining people’s differing verdicts.)  
 More importantly, though, it is simply a mistake to think that by merely surveying people’s opinions about the moral 
permissibility of certain actions, we can empirically study what sorts of factors elicit characteristically deontological judgments. All 
these studies tell us is that these people make certain moral judgments about certain scenarios, and certain other moral judgments 
about certain other scenarios; which of these judgments count as characteristically deontological is not something we can just read 
off from the empirical results. (Sometimes Greene suggests that we can sidestep this worry by postulating that philosophers are 
confused about the meaning of the term “deontology,” and although they think it refers to an abstract moral theory, in fact it 
refers to a psychological natural kind, namely the verdicts of the emotional subsystem; see his “Secret Joke,” pp. 37-38. However, 
in making this claim Greene is committing himself to an incredibly controversial claim in the philosophy of language. It’s one 
thing to say that although we think “water” refers to one sort of physical substance, in fact it refers to another sort of physical 
substance. Greene’s claim, however, is akin to saying that although we think that “Goldbach’s conjecture” refers to an abstract 
mathematical theory, in fact it refers to the physical process of digestion, or to saying that although we think that the name 
“Barack Obama” refers to a certain person, in fact it refers to the number 7.)   26 
difficult as the old problem of formulating a principle that distinguishes the permissible options in trolley-
like cases from the impermissible ones. After all, Greene et al.’s initial “ME HURT YOU” criteria were 
inspired  by  Thomson’s  proposed  solution  to  the  trolley  problem  in  her  1985  article  “The  Trolley 
Problem,” and it fell victim to Kamm’s lazy Susan case, which was originally offered as a counterexample 
to Thomson’s very proposal. So settling on a fully adequate account of the sorts of features to which 
deontological judgments are responding is likely to be an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task, and 
until that task has been completed, we cannot be sure whether P1 is true. 
  Second worry: even if we were able to find a way of characterizing the factors which deontological 
judgments are responding to that makes P1 true, it is far from clear that P2 would still seem plausible. It is 
one thing to claim that a faculty which responds to how “up close and personal” a violation is is responding to 
morally irrelevant features, but quite another thing to claim that a faculty which responds to whatever the 
sorts of features are that distinguish the footbridge case from the trolley driver case is responding to morally irrelevant 
features. Once we fix on what those features are, P2 may well strike us as false.74 
Third worry: even if P2 does strike us as true, the argument’s conclusion does not follow, for C2 
does not follow from C1. Suppose we deem some of the features triggering deontological intuitions to, 
intuitively,  be  morally  irrelevant,  thus  granting  P2.  This  is  a  strike  against  deontological  intuitions. 
However, we can only conclude that consequentialist intuitions should be privileged over deontological 
intuitions if a parallel case cannot be made against consequentialist intuitions. Moreover, it is open to the 
defender of  deontology  to  reply that,  intuitively,  the faculty eliciting consequentialist reactions  is  also 
responding to morally irrelevant factors, or failing to respond to morally relevant ones. For example, a 
deontologist could contend that the neural processes giving rise to consequentialist judgments are failing 
to respond to morally relevant factors by ignoring the separateness of persons, or by treating people as 
                                                         
74   Indeed, there is a sense in which this objection is already apropos even if we assume Greene et al.’s “ME HURT YOU” 
proposal  to  be  fully  adequate.  Greene  performs  a  sort  of  shell  game  here:  first  he  proposes  that  the  dilemmas  eliciting 
deontological reactions are dilemmas that, intuitively, involve harm committed in an “up close and personal” manner, and then 
he glosses dilemmas that, intuitively, involve harm committed in an “up close and personal” manner in terms of the “ME HURT 
YOU” criteria. However, when it comes time to decide whether  deontological judgments are responding to morally relevant 
factors, Greene switches back to evaluating things in terms of the intuitive up-close-and-personal-harm distinction, rather than in 
terms of the “ME HURT YOU” criteria. However, it’s one thing to say that whether one has committed a harm in an “up close and personal” 
manner is a morally irrelevant factor, and quite another thing to say that whether one has initiated a new threat that brings about serious 
bodily harm to another individual is a morally irrelevant factor.   27 
vats of well-being, or by assuming that all value is to-be-promoted, or by making morality incompatible 
with integrity, or . . . [insert your favorite anti-consequentialist intuition here]. So basically we have just 
recapitulated the same old battle of intuitions over the plausibility of consequentialism versus deontology 
in our evaluation of which sorts of factors are and are not morally relevant. 
Which leads to my most pressing worry: the neuroscientific results seem to be doing no work in 
this argument. The epistemic efficacy of consequentialist versus deontological intuitions now appears to be 
purely  a  function  of  what  sorts  of  features  out  there  in  the  world  they  are  each  responding  to.  We  have  three 
distinctions on the table:75 
•  dilemmas that engage emotion processing vs. dilemmas that engage “cognitive” processing; 
•  dilemmas that elicit deontological judgments vs. dilemmas that elicit consequentialist judgments; 
•  personal moral dilemmas vs. impersonal moral dilemmas. 
Greene  et  al.’s  dual-process  hypothesis  posits  that  the  first  of  these  distinctions  matches  up  with  the 
second. In order to experimentally assess this hypothesis, Greene and his colleagues identified the second 
distinction with the third one, and then directly tested whether the first distinction matches up with the 
third. But the argument from morally irrelevant factors only depends on Greene et al.’s identification of the second 
distinction with the third one. Thus the neuroscientific results are beside the point. In particular: 
•  The  “emotion-based”  nature  of  deontological  intuitions  has  no  ultimate  bearing  on  the 
argument’s cogency. (Delete “emotional” from P1 and C1, and the argument is just as plausible.) 
•  Issues  about  the  evolutionary  history  of  our  dispositions  to  have  deontological  and 
consequentialist intuitions are also irrelevant to the argument’s cogency. 
•  Even the claim that these two sets of intuitions stem from separate faculties is irrelevant to the 
argument’s cogency. (The argument  would  be  just  as plausible  if it turned out that only one 
faculty was responding to two different sorts of factors.) 
So the appeal to neuroscience is a red herring: what’s doing all the work in the argument from morally 
                                                         
75   More precisely, we have four distinctions on the table, since we need to distinguish between the intuitive way of cashing 
out the personal vs. impersonal moral dilemma distinction, and the more regimented way of cashing out that distinction in terms 
of the “ME HURT YOU” criteria.   28 
irrelevant factors is (a) Greene’s identification, from the armchair, of the distinction between dilemmas-
eliciting-deontological-reactions  and  dilemmas-eliciting-consequentialist-reactions  with  the  distinction 
between  personal  and  impersonal  moral  dilemmas,  and  (b)  his  invocation,  from  the  armchair,  of  a 
substantive intuition about what sorts of factors out there in the world are and are not morally relevant. 
  The  basic problem is that once we  rest our normative weight on  an evaluation of the moral 
salience of the factors to which our deontological and consequentialist judgments are responding, we end 
up factoring out (no pun intended) any contribution that the psychological processes underlying those 
judgments might make to our evaluation of the judgments in question. So we are left with a dilemma: 
appeal to a substantive intuition about what sorts of factors are morally relevant, and the neuroscientific 
results drop out of the picture; or keep those results in, and it looks like our only recourse is to one of the 
bad arguments we have already dismissed. 
  Thus I conclude that the argument from morally irrelevant factors does not advance the dialectic 
on the relative merits of deontology versus consequentialism. No reasonable philosopher is going to deny 
that it makes no moral difference whether one harms someone with one’s bare hands or from a distance. 
However,  deontologists  are  most  definitely  going  to  deny  that  so  crude  a  distinction  is  what  really 
underlies their distinctively deontological moral judgments. And once we have in hand the true account of 
what sorts of factors underwrite deontological judgments about cases, I claim that evaluation of their 
moral relevance will depend on a substantive normative judgment as to whether observing those sorts of 
moral  distinctions  is  more  or  less  plausible  than  ignoring  the  sorts  of  moral  distinctions  that 
consequentialists  typically  ignore.  The  appeal  to  neuroscience  provides  no  new  traction  on  this  old 
debate.76 
VI. An Indirect Role for Neuroscience? 
One of the things that seemed so exciting about Greene’s research was that it promised a new way of 
                                                         
76   To see how little work the neuroscience is now doing in the argument from morally irrelevant factors, consider this: should 
we perform additional experiments to see what parts of the brain light up when certain people make a judgment that such-and-such-
factors-picked-out-by-deontological-judgments are not morally relevant, and what parts of the brain light up when other people make a 
judgment that such-and-such-factors-ignored-by-consequentialist-judgments are in fact morally relevant? What would that possibly tell us? (Shall 
we then perform yet more experiments to see what parts of the brain light up when people make a judgment about the relevance 
of the factors to which those second-order judgments are responding, and so on, ad infinitum?)   29 
finally resolving the trolley problem. Rather than having to hit upon a compact, exceptionless principle 
that delivers the intuitive verdict about every trolley-like case, we could use the neuroscientific results and 
some philosophical theorizing to discount certain of those intuitive verdicts, making it easier to find a 
principle that fits the leftover data. However, one of the things I have just argued is that in order to use the 
neuroscientific  results  and  some  philosophical  theorizing  to  discount  certain  intuitive  verdicts  about 
trolley-like cases, Greene in effect needs to have already solved the trolley problem. Since the argument 
for why we should discount a certain set of intuitive verdicts depends on evaluating the features to which 
those intuitive verdicts are responding, we need an exceptionless (but not necessarily compact) principle 
delineating the sorts of features that make those sorts of intuitive verdicts kick in. So there is one way in 
which Greene’s task is more difficult than the traditional trolley problem: rather than needing to find a 
single principle that states what it takes for an option in a trolley-like dilemma to count as permissible or impermissible, 
he needs to find two principles: one principle stating what it takes for the deontological faculty to count an option in 
a trolley-like dilemma as permissible or impermissible, and another principle stating what it takes for the consequentialist 
faculty to count an option in a trolley-like dilemma as permissible or impermissible (plus an account of how conflicts 
between the two faculties are resolved). But there is another way in which Greene’s task is easier than the 
traditional trolley problem: he doesn’t need his account of the sorts of features to which either of these 
faculties  is  responding  to  be  rationally  defensible.  Moreover,  it  seems  that  there  is  a  way  in  which 
neuroscience could play an indirect role in this task that Greene has set for himself—and, by extension, a 
way in which neuroscience could play an indirect role in more traditional attempts at solving the trolley 
problem. 
  Suppose we have established that a certain region of the brain is activated when we contemplate a 
certain class of cases that yield characteristically deontological verdicts about what it is morally permissible 
to do. Suppose, also, that we have independent knowledge that in non-moral cases this brain region is 
recruited to distinguish between (say) intentional and non-intentional action. Then we might try seeing 
whether what distinguishes this class of moral dilemmas from others has something do with the intentional 
versus non-intentional action distinction. Since neuroscience only provides evidence of correlations, it is 
not certain that when the brain region in question is recruited for moral cases it is responding to the same   30 
sorts of features as when it is recruited for non-moral cases. But the neuroscientific results can give us clues 
for where to look when trying to characterize what sorts of features out there in the world each moral 
faculty is responding to. And this is true whether our ultimate aim is to debunk or to vindicate those 
verdicts. However, note that, even here, the neuroscientific results play no role after we have the principles 
stating what sort of features each faculty is responding to: at that point, the argument for whether we 
should  or  should  not  discount  the  verdicts  of  one  of  these  faculties  proceeds  entirely  via  armchair 
theorizing about whether the sorts of features to which that faculty is responding are or are not morally 
relevant. Still, providing clues for where to look when attempting to characterize the features to which 
distinctively deontological and distinctively consequentialist judgments respond is no small matter.77 
  Could neuroscience play a more direct role in our theorizing about the evidential status of moral 
intuitions? It seems to me that the best-case scenario is this: 
the best-case scenario:  We notice that a portion of the brain which lights up whenever we 
make  a  certain  sort  of  obvious,  egregious  error  in  mathematical  or  logical 
reasoning also lights up whenever we have a certain moral intuition. 
In this case, should we discount the moral intuition? That depends on how we fill in the details of the case. 
If, for all we can see, there is no connection between the content of the moral intuition and the content of 
the mistaken bit of mathematical/logical reasoning, then I am inclined to think we should continue to 
trust the intuition and hold out for later neuroscience to make finer distinctions between the portions of 
the brain activated in the moral and non-moral cases. (Suppose the same part of the brain that lights up 
whenever  we  affirm  the  consequent  also  lights  up  whenever  we  have  an  intuition  that  infanticide  is 
impermissible; would you be willing to start killing babies on those grounds?) If, on the other hand, we 
come to see that the moral intuition in question rests on the same sort of confusion present in the mistaken 
bit of mathematical/logical reasoning, then of course we should discount the moral intuition, but in that 
case the neuroscience isn’t playing a direct justificatory role. Again, we might not have thought to link the 
moral intuition to that sort of mathematical/logical blunder if we hadn’t known the neuroscientific results; 
but again, once we do link them, it seems that we do so from the comfort of an armchair, not from the 
                                                         
77   Although Greene et al.’s attempt in “An fMRI Investigation” at characterizing the features that give rise to deontological 
judgment did not rely on neuroscience in the way I have just sketched, there is a sense in which evolutionary theory played just that 
sort of indirect role, since evolutionary considerations are what partially led them to try out the proposal they put forward.   31 
confines of an experimental laboratory. It is as if, while trying to prove whether or not some mathematical 
claim is true, your mathematician friend had said to you, “Why don’t you try using the Brouwer fixed 
point theorem?” If you end up proving the claim to be true using that theorem, your justification for the 
claim in no way depends on your friend’s testimony. (After all, she didn’t give away whether she thinks the 
claim is true or false.) Nonetheless, your friend’s testimony gave you a hint for where to look when trying 
to prove or disprove the mathematical claim. So too, I speculate, neuroscience can provide hints for 
where to look during our normative theorizing, but ultimately it can play no justificatory role in that task. 
Despite Greene’s and Singer’s claims to the contrary, learning about the neurophysiological bases of our 
moral intuitions does not give us good reason to privilege certain of those intuitions over others.78 
                                                         
78    Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre in St. Andrews, at the Harvard 
Kennedy School’s Safra Center for Ethics, at the Harvard Humanities Center’s Cognitive Theory and the Arts Seminar, and at 
the 2009 Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress in Boulder, Colorado (where my commentator was Daniel Demetriou). Joshua D. 
Greene was kind enough to attend both sessions at Harvard and to offer clarifications and replies. For written comments on 
earlier drafts, I am indebted to Jacob Beck, Carol Berker, Tyler Doggett, Frances Kamm, Christine Korsgaard, Seana Shiffrin, 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, and Hasko Vonkriegstein (on behalf of the moral psychology reading group at Toronto University). For 
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